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PHARMACEUTICAL REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS: PRESUMPTIONS, PROCEDURAL
BURDENS, AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE
GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS
By Catherine J.K. Sandovalt
Abstract
This Article analyzes recent developments in antitrust law,
focusing on agreements between pharmaceuticalpatent holders and
generic drug manufacturers that require a generic manufacturer to
delay its market entry in exchange for a payment or other
considerationfrom the patent holder. A predictable consequence of
settlements that delay the marketing of a generic drug is that prices
for the patented drug will remain higher than if the generic
competitor had prevailed in its challenge to the patent's validity or
the patent holder hadfailed to show that the generic infringed on its
patent. Analysis of the legality of these settlements has huge
consequences for drug competition, health care costs, the average
American family budget, the law, and publicpolicy.
I.

INTRODUCTION: PHARMACEUTICAL SETTLEMENTS:
PRESUMPTIONS, PROCEDURAL BURDENS, AND COVENANTS NOT
TO SUE GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS

The Santa Clara University Computer and High-Tech Law
Journal (CHTLJ) invited me to submit this Article to reflect on the
Journal's contributions to antitrust law during the past five years as
we celebrate the Journal's silver anniversary. I congratulate the
CHTLJ for its many contributions to the development of the law. The
themes explored in CHTLJ articles regarding antitrust and
competition law-- conceptualizing the purpose of antitrust law,
whether to protect consumers and competition or to promote
efficiency, and the dichotomous construction of those goals - the
f
Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. Thanks to Mark Lemley, Tyler
Ochoa, Reza Dibadj, Colleen Chien, and Rebecca Unruh for their comments on this Article's
thesis. Thanks to former CHTLJ Editor-in-Chief Dave Martens, CHTLJ Managing Editor
Johnathan Elton, the CHTU staff, editors and supporters, and to SCU Law student Hillary
Mattis for her research on this topic.
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interaction between contract, intellectual property, regulation, and
technology, and their effects on competition, innovation, and
consumer choice- resonate for scholars, regulators, businesses, the
legal community and consumers attempting to resolve antitrust
disputes in light of the laws, policies and themes that animate them.
This Article analyzes recent antitrust law developments
regarding agreements between pharmaceutical patent holders and
generic drug manufacturers that require a generic manufacturer to
delay its market entry in exchange for a payment or other
consideration from the patent holder (reverse settlement agreements).
A predictable consequence of settlements that delay the marketing of
a generic drug is that prices for the patented drug will remain higher
than if the generic competitor had prevailed in its challenge to the
patent's validity or the patent holder had failed to show that the
generic infringed on its patent. Analysis of the legality of these
settlements has huge consequences for drug competition, health care
costs, the average American family budget, the law, and public
policy.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and third-party plaintiffs
have alleged that many of these agreements are anticompetitive and
violate the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition,
as well as unfair and deceptive practices affecting interstate
commerce. 2 These settlements have also been challenged as a
violation of the Section I of the Sherman Act which prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations." 3 The standards of the Sherman Act and the FTC Act
are far more nuanced than their broad statutory charges indicate,
leaving courts to determine whether the settlement is a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, or to balance the potential
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment settlements against their
alleged pro-competitive benefits under a rule of reason standard,
while also considering the effect of the patents on antitrust liability.
Recent court decisions have refused to condemn such settlements
as a violation of antitrust laws, instead finding protection for the
parties' agreement under the scope of the patent rights at issue.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-61 (2000). See, e.g., Complaint,
FTC v. Cephalon, Civil Action No. 08-cv-2141-RBS (E.D.P.A. 2008) [hereinafter Cephalon
Complaint]; Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer, Case No. 05-2852cv(CON), 052853cv(CON)(2007)(Second Circuit).
3. Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2007). See also Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2007)
(protecting commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies).
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Lorelei Ritchie's CHTLJ article observed that contract law is
increasingly being used to solve intellectual property disputes, and
that while contract law "typically allows parties to devise their own
arrangements, there are certain overriding normative restrictions in
intellectual property law primarily involving misuse, antitrust,
estoppel, and consumer protection." 4 The multi-billion dollar question
remains whether pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements are
illegal and violate antitrust and unfair competition laws.
Section II of this article explores the features of the HatchWaxman Act (HWA) that authorized the expedited process for Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of generic drugs, the
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), 5 and the amendments to
the HWA in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (MMA).6 It contends that the MMA amendments
have not achieved their goal of removing barriers to competition and
lower drug prices erected and fortified by reverse payment
settlements with potential generic competitors, despite high hopes to
the contrary.
Section III analyzes the legal principles that have animated
review of reverse payment settlements including the debate about the
relevant standard of review. That section explores the evolution of
reverse payment settlements starting with the In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation [Cardizem] where the Sixth Circuit in 2003 found
that the settlement at issue, which prohibited generic drug makers
from marketing drugs not implicated by the Name Brand Drug (NBD)
holder's patent, was per se illegal.' Since Cardizem, even when such
settlements involve payments of a hundred million dollars or more to
the potential generic competitor as part of a deal wherein the generic
promises to delay its market entry, the legal question in reverse
payment cases has increasingly focused on whether the settlement
was within the scope of the patent. Courts have given little weight to
4. Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine With Intellectual Property Law: An
InterdisciplinarySolution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & IIGH TECH L.J. 105, 115, 118 (2008)
(contract law encourages "the resolution and settlement of disputes that have arisen or may
arise" based on the parties assessment of future outcomes).
5. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)) (known as the
"Hatch-Waxman Act" after the Act's sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah and Representative
Henry Waxman of California).
6. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071 (2003) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
(2007)).
7. In re Cardizem Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899, 908 n. 13 (6th Cir. 2003).
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examination of the anticompetitive effect of settlements designed to
prevent determination of the patent's validity and scope or to the
distinction between cases focusing on whether the generic drug
infringed on the patent, as opposed to cases challenging the patent's
validity.
Section IV of this Article argues that recent reverse payment
settlement court decisions have inappropriately converted procedural
presumptions that the plaintiff challenging a patent's validity bears
the burden of proof of invalidity into a substantive shield against
antitrust liability. It argues that this presumption is inapplicable when
the key issue is whether the generic drug infringed on the patent since
there is no presumption of infringement and the patent holder has the
burden of proof to make a prima facie case of infringement. It argues
that these presumptions and procedural burdens question the
conclusion that settlement agreements should be immune from
antitrust liability when they are designed to leave the underlying
questions of infringement or invalidity undetermined. It also critiques
reverse payment settlement decisions that have used improper
standards to shift the burden of proof to the generic drug applicant to
prove non-infringement or to limit antitrust liability to cases of sham
litigation.
Section V analyzes the imperative of considering whether a
reverse payment settlement erects or maintains barriers to third-party
competition. It scrutinizes the use of covenants not sue which are
often deployed in an attempt to block or delay the ability of generic
drug companies to obtain a legal judgment necessary to meet the
HWA's requirements. While the 2007 MedImmune case8 has blunted
the ability of covenants not to sue to block jurisdiction for ANDA
filers to seek a declaratory judgment as to the patent's validity or their
generic drug's non-infringement, such covenants are still deployed to
delay or forestall competition through legal challenges to jurisdiction
to hear the generic challenger's case. This Article recommends that
Congress require covenants not to sue and similar tactics be reported
to the FTC when they are used in an attempt to deny subject matter
jurisdiction for substantive determination of patent rights necessary
for FDA approval of a generic drug application. It recommends that
as part of its examination of the anticompetitive effects of settlements,
courts and the FTC should consider the parties' use of and
representations about covenants not to sue and similar devices
intended to create delays or deter competition by generic competitors.
8.

Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 n.1 1(2007).
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Section VI recommends judicial, legislative and FTC scrutiny of
the role of covenants not to sue when used to attempt to deprive
ANDA filers, particularly subsequent filers, of the ability to challenge
a patent's validity. It suggests additional legislative action to promote
both name-brand drug and generic innovation, safeguard competition
and protect consumers.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE MEDICARE AMENDMENTS:
BALANCING INNOVATION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TO PROMOTE GENERIC DRUG MARKET
ENTRY AND COMPETITION

In order to analyze the antitrust implications of reverse payment
settlements, it is necessary to reprise the key features of the FDA drug
approval process for generic drugs as provided in the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 9 An overview of the 2003 Medicare amendments (MMA),10
which tried to limit the ability of drug companies to stave off
competition through manipulation of the HWA process, reveals why
reverse payment settlements and other tactics limit competition,
despite the hopes of the MMA's drafters.
To obtain FDA approval to market a new drug, extensive
research, development, testing, and successful clinical trials are
required to demonstrate the drug's safety and efficacy, often requiring
years of effort and millions of dollars." Once successful trials are
completed, a New Drug Application (NDA) is submitted for FDA
approval.1 2 The HWA recognized that the drug's formula or delivery
mechanism is often based on one or more patents granted by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and requires the ANDA filer to
certify its belief as to the effect of the application on the NDA's
filer's patents.' 3
The HWA attempted to balance the incentives for new drug
innovation, recognizing the substantial investment of time and money

9.
10.
I1.

HWA, supra note 5.
MMA, supra note 6.
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust

Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 509 (2007).

12.
13.
following
submitted
the patent
should be
invalid or

21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1) (2009).
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (A)(i)-(iv) (requiring the generic company to certify one of the
regarding each patent listed in the "Orange Book" where the FDA lists patents
by a new drug innovator: (1) no patent information has been filed with the FDA; (2)
has expired; (3) the patent will expire on a particular date and approval of the ANDA
deferred until expiration; or (4) in the opinion of the ANDA applicant, the patent is
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug).
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necessary to obtain FDA approval for new drugs, the right to exclude
others from infringing on appropriately granted patents relevant to
that drug, the high drug prices characteristic of the period when only
the patent holder can market the drug, and the public interest in
competition when generic drug makers are allowed to market a
bioequivalent medication and substantially decrease drug prices.14
The HWA allows a generic drug maker to file an ANDA to obtain
expedited approval to market a generic version of a drug.' 5 To obtain
expedited FDA approval under the HWA, the applicant must show
that its generic drug performs the same function and contains the
same active drug as the NBD,16 and is the NBD's "bioequivalent" in
that the drugs are absorbed at the same rate and to the same extent.' 7
Several antitrust lawsuits have challenged settlements of
litigation between a NBD maker which holds patents germane to that
drug and a potential marketer of the generic version of a drug wherein
the parties agree to delay marketing of the generic drug, often in
exchange for cash payments in the millions to the potential generic
competitor. In 2008, the Federal Circuit In re Ciproflaxin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation [hereinafter Cipro], analyzed a
settlement concerning Bayer's antibiotic drug Cipro used to treat
Anthrax, wherein Bayer and the generic applicant agreed to payments
and "side-deals" for marketing and promotional arrangements worth
nearly $400 million, in consideration for the generic's agreement to
amend its FDA filing and enter the market years later, but on a date
before the relevant patent expired.' 8 Like the settlement at issue in
Cipro, many settlements have included agreements that the generic
can seek FDA approval to market its drug before the patent(s) at issue
expire, but on a date often years after such competition would have
begun if the case had not settled and the NBD's patent had been
found invalid, or the patent holder had not proven that the generic
14. See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed.Trade Comm'n, Speech at the Center for
American Progress, "Pay for Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Can
Congress Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health
Care
Reform
(The
$35
Billion
Solution),
(June
23,
2009),
http://www2.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf (pointing out that the
Hatch-Waxman Act resulted in lower drug prices and that when multiple generic versions of a
drug are on the market the drug's price can drop to 90% of the name brand drug); Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
16. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
17. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7) (2000).
18. In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009).
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drug infringed on its patent.
These settlements are often called "reverse payment settlements"
because the party claiming its patent was infringed or defending the
patent's validity pays millions of dollars to the generic company it
claims infringed the patent to end their litigation and the generic's
challenges to the patent's validity.19 Courts, Congress, regulators,
scholars, lawyers, businesses, the legal community, consumers, and
consumer advocates have debated whether such practices promote
innovation, increase incentives for drug research, and efficiently
resolve patent litigation, or harm consumers and unduly limit
competition.
Christopher M. Holman's 2007 CHTLJ article, "Do Reverse
Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?" argued that "[a]ny
attempts to restrict the rights of pharmaceutical patent owners should
only be undertaken while bearing in mind the potential harm to
incentives for innovation, and ultimately the impact this might have
on the next generation of innovative drugs." 2 0 Taking a dimmer view
of the effect of reverse payment settlements on innovation and
competition, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Liebowitz
contends that ending such settlements could save $35 billion in health
care costs over the next five years. 2 1 Chairman Liebowitz argues that
such reverse payment settlements maintain high prices by averting
generic competition with a patented drug, unduly allowing the patent
holder to charge monopoly profits.2 2
The HWA recognizes that a generic drug manufacturer is not
entitled to FDA approval to market a drug that would infringe on the
scope of the name-brand drug holder's valid patent during the life of
that patent.23 Nonetheless, the FTC contends that many of these
settlements are strategically designed to end litigation that would
determine the patent's validity with the object of limiting competition
that preserves the monopoly.24 As a consequence, the patent holder is
19. Holman, supra note II, at 494 (in most patent litigation the alleged infringer pays the
patent holder, whereas in "reverse payment" cases the patent holder pays the alleged infringer to
withhold the generic drug from the market).
20. Holman, supra note 11, at 504.
21. Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1-2.
22. Id.
23. See 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (2009) (requiring certifications with regard to the
status of the NDA patents and the effect of the ANDA application on those patents).
24. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Speech to FIW- Innsbruck
Symposium on Innovation and Competition Law, The EC's Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
Preliminary Report- Wading Into the Thicket of the Antitrust/Intellectual Property Overlap
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090226innsbruck.pdf
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able to charge high prices for its drugs, a practice the FTC contends
constitutes unfair competition and unfair practices in violation of the
FTC Act.25
Under the auspices of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drugmaker may challenge a patent by providing a Paragraph IV
certification to the FDA that alleges that the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the generic drug for which approval is sought.26
An ANDA filer under the HWA must notify the NBD maker of its
application to the FDA for abbreviated generic approval. 27 Receipt of
a Paragraph IV certification entitles the patent holder to sue the
potential generic drug maker for infringement within 45 days of
receipt of that notice.28
Richard Smith pointed out in the CHTLJ that "[i]f the patentee
files suit within the 45-day period, the FDA may not approve the
ANDA until the expiration of the 30-month period beginning on the
date of receipt of notice." 2 9 This provision gives the patent holder
tremendous incentives to sue to delay FDA approval. The 30-month
time-period was intended to allow the parties to resolve their litigation
claims about the validity of the incumbent's patent and whether the
generic infringes that patent.3 0
These settlements are often challenged as erecting barriers to
entry for subsequent ANDA filers by strategically ensuring that FDA
approval timelines for bringing a generic drug to market are not
triggered. For drugs where the first applicant filed a Paragraph IV
certification before December 2003, before the effective date of the
MMA amendments, "the FDA may not approve other generic
versions of the same drug until 180 days after the earlier date on
which (1) the first company begins commercial marketing of its
generic version of the drug, or (2) an appeals court finds the patent(s)

25. Id.
26. Holman, supra note 11, at 505 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000); 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2005)). The ANDA applicant may also apply to the FDA by providing a
certification under other provisions, notably paragraph Ill, which certifies that the patent will
expire on a particular date and approval of the ANDA should be deferred until that patent's
expiration. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (A)(iii). This certification effectively acknowledges that the
NBD patent is valid and that the generic drug would infringe on that patent.
27. Holman, supranote I1, at 505 (citing21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(vii)).
28. Id.
29. Richard Smith, Hatch Waxman 2003 - Patented v. Generic Drugs: Regulatory,
Legislative and Judicial Developments, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695,

699 (2004).
30. 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)

(2007).
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subject to paragraph IV certification are invalid or not infringed." 3 1
This creates a 180-day period of exclusivity for marketing of the
generic drug by the entity making the first Paragraph IV filing within
the prescribed time period.
Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson observed that the "[t]he HatchWaxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to challenge weak or
narrow drug patents by providing an "exclusivity period" to the first
company to file an ANDA." 3 2 This exclusivity creates duopoly
competition between the patent holder and only one generic drug
maker for a six month time period after the FDA approves the generic
ANDA application. Prices will likely fall after that six month period
expires when other generics enter the market and the competitive field
expands. The FDA found that "the price of a generic drug averages
94% percent of the brand price when there is one generic competitor
on the market, and that the entry of a second generic competitor
reduces prices to 52% of brand price." 33 Holman argues that patent
holders are motivated to pay settlements not only to protect profits,
but to minimize the risk of an adverse court decision that invalidates
its patent rights.34
That exclusivity period creates incentives to enter into
settlements that delay the first Paragraph IV party's entry into the
market and obstruct marketing by other generic drug makers of the
equivalent drug until that exclusivity period ends. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Mark Janis and Mark A. Lemley point out that reverse
payments may not only stave off generic drug competition from the
other party to the settlement, but also erect barriers to competition
from other generic drug manufacturers whose FDA applications are
blocked by the application of the generic that took the payment to stay
out of the market.
Holman observed that "[i]f the parties to a paragraph IV
31.
21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv) (2000). The HWA was amended in 2003 by the MMA in
an attempt to reduce the ability of a generic to "park" its application and block third parties if
the generic does not bring its product to market. Homan contends those amendments have not
been effective in preventing parking that blocks other potential generics. Holman, supra note I1,
at 505 n. 161 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(d) (2005)).
32. Richard D. Chaves Mosier and Steven W. Ritcheson, In re Cardizem and Valley
Drug: A View from the FaultlineBetween Patent and Antitrust in PharmaceuticalSettlements,
20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 497, 500 (2004).

33. Id. at 505 (citing FDA.gov., Generic Competition and Drug Price)
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOfices/CDER/ucmI29385.htm.
34. Holman, supra note 11, at 525.
35. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719, 1720-21 (2003).
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litigation reach an agreement pursuant to which the first-filer agrees
to delay or forgo market entry, the 180-day generic exclusivity(GE)
period will not begin until after the patent litigation is decided in the
first-filer's favor."3 6 Holman notes that if "the agreement is a final
settlement, resulting in dismissal of the infringement action, the 180day GE period is never triggered."3 7 Thus, the time clock providing
180-days of marketing exclusivity to the first generic to issue a
Paragraph IV certification never ends because it never begins.38
Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson argued that "collusion can
effectively 'bottle-neck' the market for generic drug manufacturers
who apply for an ANDA subsequent to the initial ANDA applicant."3 9
The exclusion of third-party generics from competition with the
patent holder are a consequence of reverse settlement agreements that
take advantage of the features of the HWA and the MMA to delay
entry and competition by the first ANDA filer, and make a conscious
choice to craft their settlement to fortify barriers to entry for
subsequent ANDA filers who are not a party to the settlement.
The FTC's 2008 complaint challenging Cephalon's settlement
with generic ANDA filers as a violation of the FTC Act alleged that
"Cephalon has taken steps to ensure that no court decision will trigger
the 180-day exclusivity period, including settling or refusing to
litigate with other generic companies that could trigger that
exclusivity period." 4 0 FTC Commissioner (now Chairman) Liebowitz
noted that "the 180-day exclusivity, which Congress created to reward
generics for entering early, does exactly the opposite: it extends the
brand's monopoly, forcing consumers to pay excessive prices for
[drugs] throughout the span of those illegal deals." 41 Chairman
Liebowitz's comments reflect not only his criticisms of the HWA and
the failure of the MMA to curb the ability to stall the clock, but also
his view that parties are manipulating those rules in an
anticompetitive fashion not sanctioned by the rules themselves.
The MMA required that parties to a reverse payment settlement
report such settlements to the FTC, leading to the FTC's finding that
36. Holman, supra note 11, at 517.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mosier and Ritcheson, supra note 32, at 501.
40. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 2.
Statement of Comm'r Jon Leibowitz, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part in the
41.
Matter of Cephalon, Inc., File No. 061-0182 (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.
www.fic.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213comment.pdf.; FTC. v. Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d 21,
23 (D.D.C. 2008) (transferring the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
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42% of reverse payment settlements in 2006 included both
compensation to the generic company and a restriction on the
generic's ability to market its product." 42 The FTC found that 79% of
the 45 settlements reported in 2007 for year 2006 involved first
ANDA filers.4 3 These settlements raise barriers to entry for both the
first and subsequent ANDA filers, caused by the settlement terms
through which the parties agree not to trigger an event that would
compromise the first ANDA's exclusivity period or start the time
clock on that period.
Subsequent ANDA filers can trigger the first ANDA filer's 180day exclusivity period by obtaining an appellate court judgment that
the relevant drug patent(s) are invalid or not infringed.44 A subsequent
filer has an incentive to bring such an action to remove the roadblock
created by the first filer's settlement with the patent holder. Such a
judgment would start the 180-day clock for the first ANDA filer so
that even if the generic cannot enter during those six months, it will
be able to enter at the end of 180 days without waiting for the
expiration of the patent or six months after the first ANDA's
negotiated settlement date with the NBD patent holder.
This same provision creates incentives for patent holders to settle
with subsequent ANDA filers or to create procedural roadblocks to a
district or appellate court finding of invalidity or infringement that
would start the clock for the first ANDA filer. By failing to sue a
subsequent ANDA filer for infringement or strategic use of covenants
not to sue, the patent holder attempts to stave off an appellate
judgment that would trigger the first ANDA filer's 180- day
exclusivity period. Through a covenant not to sue, the patent holder
promises not to sue the potential generic competitor. Some patent
holders argue that a covenant not to sue deprives the generic of the
"case or controversy" necessary for subject matter jurisdiction for the
subsequent ANDA filer's declaratory judgment action.45 Section V of
this Article analyzes the use of these covenants in more depth and the

FTC., AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE
42.
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003,
SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2007, A REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, at

2, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/05/mmaact.pdf
43. Id.
44. Ankur N. Patel, Delayed Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment on the HatchWaxman Act and the "Approval Bottleneck", 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1075, 1086 (2009) (citing
Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 289 F.3d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
45. Caraco Pharms. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

152 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
roadblocks they still create, despite the Supreme Court's 2007 ruling
in MedImmune v. Genentech that requires consideration of "all
circumstances" to determine jurisdiction in such cases.46
This pattern of settlements, litigation, strategic non-litigation or
techniques such as covenants not to sue has indicated that despite
optimism that the MMA modifications to the HWA would remove
legal roadblocks to first or subsequent ANDA filer's marketing of the
generic drug, the MMA's goals have not been realized. These
roadblocks persist despite the MMA provisions that trigger the first
ANDA filer's loss of its 180-day marketing exclusivity if certain
"forfeiture" events occur for agreements subject to the MMA, where
the ANDA was filed "after December 8, 2003 and there was no
Paragraph IV certification to the listed drug by any other ANDA filer
prior to December 8, 2003."47
The first MMA forfeiture trigger is the first ANDA filer's failure
to market by the later of two events. The first is an event known as the
"(aa)" clause date, either 75 days after FDA approval of the first
applicant is made effective or 30 months after the date of submission
of the first ANDA's application. The second event is the "(bb)" clause
date, 75 days after the date on which at least one of the following has
occurred regarding the patents in the Paragraph IV certification: (1) in
an infringement action or declaratory judgment regarding the patent
in the Paragraph IV certification "a court enters a final decision from
which no appeal (other than petition to the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not
infringed," 48 or (2) in an infringement action or a declaratory
judgment a court signs a settlement order or consent decree that enters
a final judgment that includes a finding that the patent is invalid or
not infringed, or (3) the patent information submitted in the ANDA
application is withdrawn by the applicant. 49 The forfeiture event
triggers only upon the occurrence of the later of the (aa) date or the
(bb) date. Even if more than 30 months pass after the ANDA is
submitted, satisfying the (aa) clause, the (bb) clause is not triggered if
the settlement with the first ANDA filer ends the litigation over the
patent's validity or the generic's non-infringement. A settlement
ensures that no judicial determination initiates forfeiture of the 180-

46.
47.
48.
49.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, n.l1 (2007).
Patel, supra note 44, at 185.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2000); Patel, supra note 44, at 1087.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
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day exclusivity period of the first ANDA under the HWA.so
Matthew Avery observed that "[t]he MMA attempted to remedy
bottlenecks in ANDA approval by creating provisions that would lead
to forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity period, but these flawed
provisions can be easily avoided by drafting settlement agreements
that contain no finding of patent invalidity or non-infringement." 5' In
many settlements, an MMA forfeiture event does not occur because
the settlement is silent on infringement of an ANDA filer's proposed
generic drug or on the invalidity of the challenged patent. To combat
this practice, Commissioner Liebowitz argued for naming first ANDA
filers as defendants if they participated in a reverse payment
settlement and refused to relinquish their 180-day exclusivity,
blocking other generic entry into the market.52
Forfeiture can also be triggered if the first ANDA holder amends
or withdraws its paragraph IV application. The FDA has interpreted
the MMA so that the first ANDA filer is not required to withdraw or
amend its application upon settlement with the patent holder,
effectively lending the FDA's regulatory weight to such delays.5 4
Many reverse payment settlements are crafted so that the first ANDA
filer does not withdraw its application, failing to trip that start time on
that basis.
The settlement evaluated in the Cipro antitrust litigation required
the first ANDA filer to withdraw its paragraph IV certification of
non-infringement or invalidity and file a new application under
paragraph III, requiring the first ANDA filer to wait until the relevant
patents expired to seek FDA approval. 5 Similar withdrawals of an
ANDA certification would create a forfeiture event under the MMA,
opening the door to subsequent ANDA filers' challenges.
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the Cipro settlement with
the first ANDA filer did not block third-party filers from challenging
the patent.5 6 Thus Cipro recognizes that a reviewing court should

50. Patel, supra note 44, at I100-01.
51.
Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failureofthe 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 200 (2008).
52.
Leibowitz,, supra note 41, at 1.
53.
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
54. Patel,supra note 44, at 1089 (citing FDA Decision Letter: Ramipril Capsules, Docket
at:
available
29,
2008),
(Jan.
2007N-0382
No.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets//DOCKETS/07nO382/07n-0382-let6.pdf).
55. In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert
denied, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009).
56. Id.
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consider whether the settlement increases or maintains barriers to
third-party generic challengers. Other settlements have maintained the
blocking position of the first ANDA applicant, a result the Eleventh
Circuit in Schering and the Second Circuit in Tamoxifen attributed to
the features of the HWA, rather than as evidence of an
anticompetitive agreement in violation of the antitrust laws."
Under the MMA, the 180-day exclusivity period of the first
ANDA filer can also be forfeited if an appellate court finds in a
decision appealable only to the Supreme Court that "an applicant
submitting a paragraph IV certification has entered into an agreement
with another applicant, or the holder of the NDA or patent owner, in
violation of the antitrust laws."58 This forfeiture event depends on
whether the reverse settlement agreement violates the antitrust laws.
The question is under what circumstances do such agreements flout
the antitrust laws?
As discussed below, the antitrust violation forfeiture provision
has not been triggered since the MMA amendments in 2003. Since
Cardizem, sophisticated parties with billions of dollars at stake have
drafted settlements that try to distinguish their features from those
condemned in Cardizem which precluded the generic from marketing
other drugs that did not infringe on the patent at issue. Appellate
Courts since Cardizem have concluded that the settlements before
them were based in large part on the scope of the patent grant and
reflected exclusivity conferred by the patent, rather than
anticompetitive collusion in violation of the antitrust laws. 9 This
reflects judicial reliance on the statutory presumption of a patent's
validity, a presumption Michael Carrier criticizes as converting a
procedural burden of proof that the plaintiff must demonstrate
invalidity, into a substantive presumption that shields the parties from
antitrust liability. 60 This Article calls attention to the legal
57. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1063-64 (11th Cir. 2005); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.
3001(2007).
Smith, supra note 29, at 708 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b), amended by Medicare
58.
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066, § 1102(a)).
59. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298-1299, 1303-1304
(I l Cir. 2003) (applying a per se standard to find that the settlement of litigation alleging that a
generic drug infringed on a NBD's patent was not a violation on the antitrust laws in light of the
exclusionary power of the NBD's patent), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004); FTC v. ScheringPlough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056, 1068, 1075; Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213-214; Ciproflaxin, 544
F.3d 1323.
60. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
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inapplicability of that presumption where the main issue litigated is
whether the generic drug infringes on the patent. The patent holder
has the burden of proof of infringement so a settlement delaying the
marketing of a non-infringing drug would not be covered by the
61
patent's exclusionary scope.
Additionally, courts since Cardizem have upheld settlements
based on the patent's scope, even when they created or maintained
roadblocks to subsequent ANDA filers. The nature of the case
method, that a court considers one case at a time based on the facts
before it, prevents courts from speculating as to what the patent
holder might do to stymie efforts of subsequent ANDA filers to
obtain a declaratory judgment as to the patent's validity or the
generic's non-infringement. This Article emphasizes the need to
inquire into the patent holder's intent to delay resolution of claims by
subsequent ANDA filers as part of the analysis of whether the
settlement with the first ANDA filer is anticompetitive.
As detailed in sections IV and V below, this Article recommends
that reviewing courts should strongly weigh whether the settlement
triggers a forfeiture event that opens the door for subsequent ANDA
challengers as a factor in determining whether the settlement is
anticompetitive or constitutes unfair competition in violation of the
antitrust laws or the FTC Act. If the settlement is crafted so that no
forfeiture event occurs, the only alternative open for subsequent
ANDA filers is to attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the
patent's invalidity or their generic drug's non-infringement. While
Congress hoped that declaratory judgment proceedings authorized by
the MMA would clear the way for generic competition, patent holders
have tried to foreclose such judgments by covenants not to sue or
other litigation tactics designed to deprive the subsequent ANDA filer
of subject matter jurisdiction for that declaratory judgment
proceeding.
As discussed in section VI, this article recommends that
Congress amend the current bills under consideration that would
regulate reverse payment settlements by requiring as a factor in
weighing whether a settlement should be approved consideration of
Presumptive Illegality, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 37, 65 (2009) (citing Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213214).
Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midlands Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
61.
reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, (Nov. 14, 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that the patent owner has the burden of proving literal infringement and must meet its burden by
a preponderance of the evidence).
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the patent holder's representations to the court or the Commission that
it will not use covenants not to sue or similar tactics to deprive subject
matter jurisdiction for declaratory judgment actions by subsequent
ANDA filers. It also recommends that Congress require that patent
holders cooperate in obtaining expedited review of declaratory
judgments for subsequent ANDA filers, a mandate they must meet for
patent litigation with the first ANDA filer. 62
The following section analyzes Cardizem and key reverse
payment settlement cases that have declined to find an antitrust
violation since Cardizem. It examines the debate in those cases about
the appropriate standard of review for reverse payment settlements. It
highlights the presumptions of patent validity in cases decided after
Cardizem, discusses the analytical shortfalls of that approach, then
considers in more detail the effect of settlements on subsequent thirdparty ANDA filers and the use of covenants not to sue.
Ill.

THE DEBATE OVER THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ANALYZING
REVERSE SETTLEMENTS

The Sixth Circuit's decision In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation, found that a reverse payment settlement agreement
wherein the patent holder agreed to pay the generic challenger $10
million dollars quarterly to preclude the generic from marketing any
version of the Cardizem drug, including those outside the scope of the
patent claims, constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.63
Cardizem found that the agreements "bolster[ed] the patent's
effectiveness," substantiating the case for per se treatment. 6 4 It
classified as anticompetitive settlements that expand the patent's
scope through an agreement to limit competition beyond the patent's
term, or forestall lower prices from generic competition which does
not infringe on the patent.65 Cardizem did not, however, explicitly
require that the settlement agreement must exceed the scope of the
challenged patent in order to find an antitrust violation.

62. Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Novartis, 482 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 21
U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).
63. In re Cardizem Antitrust Litig., 332 F. 3d 896, 899, 908, n. 13 (6th Cir. 2003). See
also Andrx Pharms. Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (11 1 h Cir. 2005) (holding
that agreement that blocked generic from "ever marketing a generic controlled release naproxen
medication 'effectively barr[ed] any generic competitors from entering the market," and was
sufficient to state a claim for conspiracy and abuse of monopoly power under the Sherman Act
under the Shenng-Plough test).
64. Cardizem, 332 F. 3d at 908.
65. Id.
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Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson noted that it was "unclear from the
decision how much weight the fact that the Agreement blocked noninfringing products had on the court's decision to use the per se rule"
to condemn the Cardizem agreements. 6 The agreement's scope was a
factor in its illegality, along with evidence of the parties' intent to use
the Section IV certification process set forth in the Hatch-Waxman
Act to block other generics from entering the market.67 The Cardizem
case suggests that the parties' anticompetitive intent should be
weighed, alongside an analysis of whether the agreement bars
competition beyond the patent's scope. Yet, Cardizem does not
announce a clear path to determine when such agreements are per se
illegal.
Subsequent cases have analyzed reverse payment settlements
under the rule of reason, focusing their analysis on whether the
settlements were commensurate with the patent's scope. The Eleventh
Circuit's 2005 Schering-Plough case rejected either a conventional
rule of reason or per se standard to analyze the FTC's challenge to
pharmaceutical reverse payments settlement, instead adopting a
modified rule of reason test that examined: "(1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent, (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceeded that scope; (3) and the resulting anticompetitive
effects." 68
Schering held a formulation patent that expired in 2006 for the
extended release coating surrounding the unpatented active ingredient
in its "K-Dur 20" medication used to treat high blood pressure and
congestive heart failure; when faced with potential competition from
Upsher, the first ANDA filer, in 1997 Shering promised to pay
Upsher $60 million labeled as "initial royalty fees" for the marketing
rights to five of Usher's drug products and Usher's agreement to
delay its marketing of a generic version of K-Dur until 2001. In

66. Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson, supra note 32, at 512.
67. Holman, supra note I1, at 543, 545 (citing Cardizem, 332 F. 3d at 907).
68. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056, 1064 n. 11 (llth Cir. 2005) (citing
FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986) (other citations omitted) which notes
that the rule of reason tests "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.").
69. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066 (recognizing that the active ingredient in
Shering's K-Dur 20 medication, potassium chloride, is commonly used and unpatentable. The
litigation focused on the formulation patent for the extended release coating that delivers the
drug's active ingredient over a period of time. The Eleventh Circuit noted that generic drug
makers could develop their own potassium chloride supplement "so long as the supplement's
coating did not infringe on Schering's patent." Schering's agreement with Upsher also involved
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1998, Schering entered into a settlement with a subsequent ANDA
filer, ESI Lederle (ESI), wherein Schering agreed to pay ESI $5
million representing ESI's legal fees spent in its litigation with
Schering, and an additional $10 million if ESI received FDA approval
to market its generic drug and delayed its market entry until 2003,
three years before the K-Dur formation patent's expiration date.70
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the need to measure the
settlement's anticompetitive effect by comparing it to the patent's
exclusionary scope, but wrongly articulated the standard for proving
and evaluating infringement claims stating that "[b]y virtue of its '743
patent, Schering obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI
from the market until they proved that the '743 patent was invalid or
that their products, Klor-con and Micro-K- 20 respectively, did not
infringe on Schering's patent."71 That statement improperly allocates
to Upsher and ESI (the "they" ambiguously referenced in the above
sentence) the burden of proving that their generic drugs do not
infringe on the patent when the law allocates to the patent holder the
burden of proving infringement.72
The Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough cited FTC complaint
counsel's acknowledgment "that it could not prove that Upsher and
ESI could have entered into the market on their own prior to the '743
patent's expiration" as an important factor that reinforced the patent's
a "side deal" to license several other Upsher drugs).
70. Id. at 1060 nn. 6, 8 (noting that Schering's settlement with ESI also involved ESI's
agreement to license two of ESI's drugs to Schering).
71.
Id. at 1066-1067.
72. The patent holder, Schering, not the generic drug maker, bears the burden of
providing that the generic drugs infringed on their patent so the Eleventh Circuit's evaluation of
the settlement at issue in Schering-Ploughis based on a legal error. See Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company v. Andrx, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1133-1134 ("In order for a product to literally
infringe a patent claim, the patentee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
accused product includes elements that are literally identical to each and every limitation of the
patent claim.") (citing Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (other citations omitted)). Bristol-Myers Squibb rejected the NBD patent holder's claim
that a potential generic competitor, Andrx, who filed under the Hatch-Waxman Act, infringed
on its patent. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Andrx, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1127. See also,
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D.Fla.
2008) ("To prevail on infringement, the patentee 'must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the accused device infringes one or more claims of the patent either literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents."') (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life
Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (other citations omitted)); Ajinomoto Co., Inc.
v. Archer-Daniels-Midlands Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh'g and reh'gen banc
denied, (Nov. 14, 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001) (patent holder bore the burden of
establishing that the other party's manufacturing process infringed on its patents); SmithKline
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing the patent
holder's burden of proving literal infringement).
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strength and validity.73 Yet, a non-infringing drug could enter the
market before the expiration of the NBD maker's relevant patent. The
Eleventh Circuit's conclusion inappropriately shifts the burden of
proving patent infringement to the FTC. It conflates patent
infringement claims with allegations of patent invalidity as evidenced
by the Eleventh Circuit's statement that "without any evidence to the
contrary, there is a presumption that the '743 patent [the time-release
formulation patent implicated by the generic filer's application] is a
valid one, which gives Schering the ability to exclude those who
infringe on its product." 74 The question is whether the generic drug
infringed on Schering's patent, an issue for which Schering bore the
burden of proof.
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that "there has
been no allegation that the '743 patent itself is invalid or that the
resulting infringement suits against Upsher and ESI were "shams."
This novel basis for refusing to find antitrust liability in a reverse
payment settlement case, unsupported by any legal authority, purports
that the FTC must prove that the patent holder's infringement claim
was invalid or a sham for anticompetitive behavior in order to find
that the settlement violated the FTC Act. The "sham" standard is a
high standard requiring that the litigation be "objectively baseless" to
lose its entitlement to antitrust immunity, recognizing the role of
litigation in seeking redress from the government.76 The
73. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1068.
74. Id. In a lawsuit brought by private plaintiffs challenging the same settlement
agreements at issue in Schering-Plough, the plaintiffs alleged that the generic manufacturer
"agreed not to enter the market with any generic competitor drug, irrespective of whether it
infringed the patent," leading the district court to conclude that "[t]hese agreements, as alleged,
grant rights to Schering in excess of what is granted by the [relevant] patent alone." In re: KDur Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp.2d 517, 532 (D.N.J. 2004). In Schering-Plough,the Eleventh
Circuit characterized the parties' settlement which covered "any sustained release
microencapsulated potassium-chloride tablet" as an "ancillary restraint" of trade necessary to
"define the parameters of the agreement and to prevent future litigation over what may or may
not infringe upon the patent." Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1072 (citing Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Yet, this settlement
precludes the generic ANDA applicants from marketing any potassium-chloride tablet that uses
a microencapsulated sustained release formula, even if that formula did not infringe on
Schering's patent. The Eleventh Circuit's characterization of the settlement's scope as an
"ancillary restraint" is particularly curious in light of its emphasis that "[i]t is uncontested that
potassium chloride is the unpatentable active ingredient in Schering's brand-name drug K-Dur
20." Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1067. Schering's patent "only covers the
individualized delivery method (the sustained release formula)." Id. Moreover, it only covers
Schering's particular sustained release formula, not microencapsulated sustained release
formulas in general for delivering an unpatented active ingredient.
75. Schering-PloughCorp., 402 F.3d at 1068.
76. Prof I Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 580 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993);
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unprecedented application of the "sham" standard to protect
infringement settlements between NBD makers and potential generic
competitors from antitrust scrutiny fails to account for the legal
allocation of the burden of proof to the patent holder to show
infringement. This burden of proof recognizes the distinction between
challenges to a patent's validity that allocates to the plaintiff the
burden of proving the patent was invalid in light of the patent office's
decision to grant a patent, as opposed to the requirement that the
patent holder must present substantial evidence to support its burden
of proof that the generic infringes on that patent.77
The Second Circuit in its 2006 analysis of the In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litigation concerning a NBD manufacturer's
allegation that an ANDA applicant's generic drug violated its patents
for the Tamoxifen, the most widely prescribed drug to treat breast
cancer, echoed Schering-Plough's emphasis on the sham litigation
line between permissible patent protection and anticompetitive
activity.78 The Second Circuit emphasized in Tamoxifen that unless
the settlement extended the NBD maker's monopoly beyond the
patent's scope, the chief issue is whether the underlying infringement
lawsuit was "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits."79 Judge
Pooler's dissent distinguishes between antitrust immunity for filing
litigation or using administrative procedures unless the litigation or
filing itself is a sham, as compared to the Tamoxifen majority's
application of the sham doctrine to define "antitrust liability in the
first instance."80 Even if the patent holder's infringement suit was not

Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
77. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1302
(S.D.Fla. 2005) (recognizing that a party challenging a patent's validity must prove invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence). Cf SmithKline, 859 F.2d at 889 (citing the patent holder's
burden of proving literal infringement by a preponderance of the evidence).
78. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 193, 213-214 (2nd Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007).
79. Id. at 213. The Tamoxifen majority contested the dissent's characterization of this
statement as requiring a showing that the underlying litigation was a sham as a basis for antitrust
liability. Id. at n.27 ("We do not... think that there is a "requirement" that antitrust plaintiffs
'must show that the settled litigation was a sham, i.e., objectively baseless, before the settlement
can be considered an antitrust violation...' There is no such requirement." "A plaintiff need not
allege or prove sham litigation in order to succeed in establishing that a settlement has provided
defendants 'with benefits exceeding the scope of the tamoxifen patent.").
80. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 224-225 (Pooler, J., dissenting). Judge Pooler observed that
"[a]lthough Zeneca's [the NBD patent holder] original suit was likely protected under the
standard set out in Professional Real Estate Investors, it does not necessarily follow that the
settlement of that suit should be judged on the same grounds." Id. at 225.
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a sham, the assertion that the lack of sham litigation confers antitrust
immunity confuses the basis for the antitrust claim. The FTC did not
challenge the infringement litigation as an anticompetitive sham; what
was at issue was whether the settlement of that litigation that involved
the NBD's payment of millions to the potential generic competitor
and the generic's promise to delay its market entry violated the
antitrust laws A patent holder is not entitled to prevent market entry
by products which do not infringe on its intellectual property rights.
The sham litigation standard fails to comport with the potential
exclusionary scope of patent rights or with antitrust jurisprudence.
Tamoxifen rejected Cardizem 's suggestion that per se liability
attached to reverse settlement agreements, and followed the Eleventh
Circuit's lead in Schering-Plough in examining whether the
agreements exceeded the scope of the patents at issue. 8 ' Tamoxifen
distinguished the Cardizem case on the facts emphasizing that unlike
the settlement agreement at issue in Cardizem, the Tamoxifen
agreement did not restrain the introduction of non-infringing products
outside of the patent's scope. 82 The Second Circuit also noted that the
Tamoxifen agreement between the patent holder and the generic filer
did not prevent other generics from challenging the incumbent's
patents, unlike the agreement scrutinized in Cardizem.8 3 The
settlements in Schering and Tamoxifen were found to track the
patent's scope, although the litigation never determined whether the
patent was valid or infringed.
In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation [hereinafter
Cipro], the Federal Circuit in 2008 reviewed the agreement between
patent holder Bayer and several generic manufacturers whereby the
generic challenger Barr agreed to amend its ANDA application with
the FDA to drop its challenge to the validity of Bayer's patent in
exchange for Bayer's payment of $398.1 million and other "copromotion" agreements with Barr.84 The agreement also allowed Barr
to market its generic six months before the relevant Bayer patent
81.
Id. at 213-214.
82. Id.
83.
Id. at 214-215 (the settlement, which followed the district court's determination that
NBD Zeneca's patent was valid, opened Zeneca's patent "to immediate challenge by other
potential generic manufacturers, which did indeed follow spurred by the additional incentive (at
the time) of potentially securing the 180-day exclusivity period available upon a victory in a
subsequent infringement lawsuit, since by vacating the district court judgment and amending its
ANDA to remove its paragraph IV certification, Barr appeared to ensure (under procedures in
effect at the time) that it was not eligible for the exclusivity period").
84. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 n.5,
reh'g en banc denied, (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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expired, a factor the Federal Circuit cited in finding the agreement did
not violate the antitrust laws."s
The Federal Circuit in Cipro emphasized that this settlement did
not create a bottleneck to other generic challengers because Barr
withdrew its paragraph IV application that challenged the validity of
Bayer's patent, opening the door for subsequent generic
manufacturers to take a shot at Bayer's patent.86 Following Barr's
amendment of its ANDA application, each of four generic challengers
lost its case contesting the validity of Bayer's patent, a fact the
Federal Circuit emphasized in upholding the settlements as within the
scope of Bayer's patent. 87
In Cipro the Federal Circuit sought to unify the goals of antitrust
and patent analysis declaring that "[t]he essence of the inquiry is
whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary
zone of the patents."88 It also agreed with the Tamoxifen and
Schering-Plough conclusions that "in absence of evidence of fraud
before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need not consider the
validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement
agreement involving a reverse payment." 89 Holman suggests that a
consensus is emerging "that will find a violation of the antitrust laws
only in cases where the challenged agreement contains restrictions on
competition that exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent."90
This observation fails to take into account the distinction between
infringement cases and litigation over the patent's validity, since
exclusion of a non-infringing drug is not within the patent's scope.
The Federal Circuit's Cipro decision emphasized that a patent is
presumed to be valid and confers the right to exclude others. The
statute it cites for this presumption, 35 U.S.C. §282, allocates the
burden of proof to the plaintiff challenging the patent's validity,
showing this presumption is rebuttable. 9 1 This rebuttable, procedural
presumption of validity is not a statutory declaration of antitrust
immunity. Moreover, this presumption does not imply that
infringement claims are assumed to be valid. Indeed, the patent holder
bears the burden of proof to make a prima facie case of
85.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1329, 1339-1340.
88. Id. at 1336.
89. Id.
90. Holman, supra note 11, at 541 (citing Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)).
91.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
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infringement.9 2
IV. PATENTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID; SHOULD A BURDEN OF
PROOF BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SUBSTANTIVE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE SETTLEMENT'S EFFECTS ARE NOT ANTICOMPETITIVE?
In the Cipro case the Federal Circuit emphasized that the
relevant patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §282, states that "patents shall be
presumed valid." 93 The Federal Circuit cited this statutory
presumption as a key factor in determining that a settlement that
reflects the patent's scope is protected by the ability to exclude others
from infringement on the patent. 94 The Federal Circuit argues that
such exclusion effectively stems from the patent laws, not from an
anticompetitive agreement.
Analysis of this statute clarifies that it allocates to the plaintiff
the burden of proof to show the patent is invalid. 95 The presumption
of a patent's validity is rebuttable. 96 A 2002 FTC report revealed that
in cases where the litigation was not settled before trial, the generic
applicant prevailed in 73% of the challenges under Hatch-Waxman
that went to trial. 97 The success of generics in challenging the validity
of NBD maker patents or showing that their drug would not infringe
emphasizes that the presumption of patent validity is only a
contestable presumption.
Cipro transforms this procedural allocation of the burden of
proof into a substantive presumption of validity that shields a patent
settlement from an antitrust claim if the settlement roughly tracks the
scope of the challenged patent. Carrier emphasizes that patent holders
are not entitled to rely on the presumption of patent validity "as
substantive evidence in preliminary-injunction proceedings."9 8 In

92. Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midlands Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
reh 'g and reh'g en banc denied, (Nov. 14, 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that the patent owner has the burden of proving literal infringement and must meet its burden by
a preponderance of the evidence).
93. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1337, reh'g en
banc denied, (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing 35 U.S.C. §282).
94. Id., at 1332-34 ("Thus, the essence of the agreement was to exclude the defendants
from profiting from the patented invention. This is well within Bayer's rights as the patentee.").
95. 35 U.S.C. §282.
96. Satish Chintapalli, Excessive Reverse Payments in the Context of Hatch-Waxman, 10
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381, 400 (2009).
97. FTC, GENERIC ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 16, available
at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
98. Carrier, supra note 60, at 64.
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Cipro, the Federal Circuit did not cite its own precedent that
previously explained that "the presumption is a 'procedural device'
for allocating burdens of production and persuasion at trial, not
'evidence which can be 'weighed' in determining likelihood of
success" at the preliminary injunction stage." 99 Without
acknowledging this distinction, the Federal Circuit improperly
converted this procedural device that allocated the burden of proof for
patent invalidity claims into a presumption that the settlement's
constraints on competition arise from the patent's scope, rather than
anticompetitive effects or animus.
Reliance on a presumption of patent validity to approve a reverse
payment settlement gives no weight to the fact that the settlement
ceases the litigation about the patent's validity so it is unknown
whether the plaintiff would have carried its burden of proof. Carrier
argues that "the presumption should be entitled to the least amount of
deference in situations in which the parties enter agreements that
prevent validity from even being challenged."100 Carrier emphasizes
"if the patent is not valid, there is no scope at all."' 0 An agreement to
limit competition based on an invalid patent would not rest on patent
law but fall squarely within the prohibitions of the Sherman and FTC
Acts.
Moreover, the Cipro case's emphasis on the presumption of
the patent's validity as a factor in upholding the settlement does not
apply where the main issue in contention is whether the generic drug
infringed on the patent. There is no presumption of infringement. The
patent owner alleging infringement bears the burden of proof that the
other party infringed on its patent by showing, for example, that the
manufacturing process was covered by the challenged patent.'0 2 Once
the patent holder has established a prima facie case of infringement,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that its conduct or process
did not infringe on the patent. 103
Cipro's stress on the presumption of the patent's validity
99. Id. (citing New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesteron Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)); Hemphill, C. Scott Hemphill, Payingfor Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlement
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y. U. L. REv. 1553, n. 181 (2006) [hereinafter Paying
for Delay].
100. Carrier, supra note 60, at 64.
Id. at 66.
101.
102. Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midlands Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that the patent owner has the burden of proving literal infringement and must meet its burden by
a preponderance of the evidence).
103. Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347.
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emphasizes that the generic bore the burden of proving that the patent
was invalid. The allocation of the burden of proof to the patent holder
to prove infringement should lead a court to reject a reverse payment
settlement and side-deals in cases with strong evidence that the
generic drug did not infringe on the patent. The patent holder's failure
to carry its burden of proof to show infringement should take the
settlement out of the umbrella of the patent's scope, opening the door
to antitrust claims.
In evaluating whether a settlement of an infringement claim is
anticompetitive, the court should give strong weight to Congress' goal
in passing the HWA and the MMA amendments: to balance
innovation, competition, and consumer welfare by promoting generic
entry and competition.'04 Cipro's logic suggests that absent a finding
that the patent holder has met its burden of proof to make out a prima
facie infringement case, the parties cannot shield their reverse
payment settlement from antitrust claims by relying on the scope of
the patent in an infringement case.
The FTC's 2008 case against Cephalon demonstrates the pitfalls
of assuming patent validity and that the generic drug infringes on the
patent as a defense to FTC Act or antitrust violations. In its complaint
characterizing Cephalon's settlement with its generic challengers as
anticompetitive, the FTC presented evidence that Cephalon's CEO
told investors prior to its settlement with the generic challengers that
it expected profits to decline with imminent generic entry. os Prior to
the settlements, Cephalon's CEO forecast on an earnings conference
call that the company assumed that "'generic versions106of mondafinil
[the patented drug at issue] enter the market midyear."'
Cephalon's patent covering the mondafinil compound expired in
2001 and the only remaining patent on the drug covers "a formulation
of mondafinil consisting of a specified distribution of small particles"
which will expire in 2015.107 The FTC cited evidence that "a
consultant advised Cephalon in 2002 that 'all the generic drug
companies know ... the [Particle Size Patent] may be easily
circumvented' by manufacturing their products to contain a
104. Hemphill, Payingfor Delay, supra note 104, at 1614-15.
105. Cephalon Complaint,supra note 2, at 148.
106. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 CoLUM. L. REv. 629, 650 n.88 (2009)
[hereinafter An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust] (citing Q3 2005 Cephalon, Inc., Earnings
Conference Call Transcript (Nov. 1, 2005), available at Factiva (statement of Frank Baldino,
Chairman and CEO, Celphalon, Inc.)).
107. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 2, at % 32-34.
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distribution of mondafinil particles sizes different than that covered
by Cephalon's patent."os This advice highlights the risk, even the
likelihood that generic drugs using a different delivery mechanism
than Cephalon's patent would not infringe on that patent.
In late 2005 through early 2006, Cephalon entered into
agreements with four potential generic drug manufacturers, all of
whom qualified as the first ANDA filer, for $200 million in
purportedly independent business transactions to settle Cephalon's
infringement claims. 1 09 Cephalon's CEO boasted to investors that
because of the settlements "'[w]e were able to get six more years of
patent protection. That's $4 billion in sales that no one expected."'110
The FTC argues that Cephalon believed its infringement claim was
weak, that the settlement was not within the patent's scope, and
violated the FTC Act.111
FTC Commissioner Rosch argues that these facts distinguish the
FTC's case against Cephalon from Tamoxifen and ScheringPlough. i2 Cephalon may argue that this settlement merely reflected
its assessment of the risk that a court would find that the generic did
not infringe on the one remaining relevant patent related to the drug's
delivery mechanism. Risk assessment is not, however, a defense to an
antitrust claim. Neither should patent law shield the parties from
antitrust liability where the evidence indicates that one or both parties
had a strong belief that the patent holder would not carry its burden of
proof that the generic drug infringed on its patent.
FTC Chairman Leibowitz argues that "the incentive to pay a
generic to abandon its patent challenge is greates for the weakest
patents."113 The patent holder's weak infringement case in Cephalon

supports this observation. The settlement also prevented
determination of whether the patent holder's infringement allegations
were a sham that would provide a separate basis for antitrust
liability.11 4 In light of these facts, the reviewing court should consider
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id.at 56.
110. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 106, at 650 (citing John
George, Hurdles Aheadfor Cephalon, PHILA. Bus. J., March 20, 2006, at 1).
Ill. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 2, at 83 (citing Cephalon CEO's statements to
investors that "'We've got Provigil [the NBD at issue] through 2012. You know the history of
the company. We didn't expect to be there.").
112. Rosch, supra note 24, at 22.
113. Leibowitz, supranote 14, at 6.
114. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 345, 364 (D. Del.
2008) (holding that "a jury could find defendants' infringement allegations objectively baseless,
such as to render the capsule litigation a sham.").

2010]

REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

167

Cephalon's public statements, actions, and the strength of the
generic's claim that their drugs did not infringe to measure the
anticompetitive effect of the settlement. Unlike the Federal Circuit's
Cipro case, this analysis may not rest on the patent's validity since
infringement, not validity, is the chief patent issue and the burden of
proof is on the patent holder to show infringement.
In another FTC complaint emphasizing the patent holder's weak
evidence of the generic's patent infringement, in January 2009, the
FTC filed suit in the Central District of California contending that the
agreement between Solvay Pharmaceuticals' (Solvay) and generic
drug makers Watson Pharmaceuticals, Paddock Laboratories and Par
Pharmaceutical Company to delay generic competition to Solvay's
testosterone-replacement drug AndroGel until 2015 violates Section 5
of the FTC Act." 5 In FTC v. Watson, et. al., the FTC and the Attorney
General for the State of California filed a complaint against Solvay
and the generics with whom it reached an agreement to delay generic
entry into the drug market.
The complaint alleges that generic drug applicants Watson and
Paddock, in partnership with Par, filed applications with the FDA to
market generic versions of AndroGel, and by early 2006 the FDA
approved Watson's application to market its generic drug.11 6 After
Watson and Paddock announced their plans to sell generic AndroGel,
Solvay sued the generic companies alleging infringement of the
AndroGel patent.11 7 The generics defended against Solvay's suit
contending that the generic products did not infringe on Solvay's
patent, that Solvay's patent was invalid, and that Solvay improperly
withheld information from the U.S. Patent Office."'
The FTC alleges that in settlement of their litigation claims, the
parties agreed to withhold their generic products from the market for
nine years until 2015, and to promote AndroGel as a means of paying
the generics for keeping their lower cost drugs out of the market." 9
The AndroGel patent expires in 2021, a fact the defendants highlight
to characterize the settlement as pro-competitive because it
accelerates generic competition to a date six years before the relevant
115. FTC et. al. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., Par Pharm. Companies, Inc., Paddock Labs., Inc.,
and Solvay Pharms., Inc.,Case No. 09-00598, (C.D. Cal. , Jan. 2009) [hereinafter FTC v. Watson
Complaint], available at: http://ww.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710060/090202androgelcmpt.pdf. The
publicly available complaint in FTC v. Watson is extensively redacted.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id. at% 4-6.
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patent expiration date.120
Holman noted that most reverse settlement agreements do not
require the generic to stay out of the market for the full term of the
patented drug, but "involve a negotiated market entry date for the
generic product that .. . typically occurs later than would have likely
occurred if the generic company had prevailed in the patent dispute,
i.e., the parties split the remaining patent term." 2 1 Holman argues that
such settlements "can promote competition by providing a guaranteed
reduction in the effective patent term that would not have occurred
absent the patent challenge." 122 He acknowledges, however, that a
successful challenge to the patent might have resulted in earlier entry
of the generic drug and opened the field to more competition.123
The FTC and the State of California contend that despite generic
entry before the patents expired in the FTC v. Watson case, the
agreement maintains high drug prices in the meantime based on a
weak claim of patent infringement, thwarts public policy to encourage
competition by generic drugs, violates unfair competition laws, and
federal and state antitrust laws.124 The FTC conducted a study of
settlements reached before 2004 and found that settlements involving
reverse payments "delay generic entry by 17 months more than
settlements without payments."1 2 5 This delay is particularly untenable
when based on a weak or dubious patent infringement claim.
In FTC v. Watson, the FTC emphasized that the potential generic
entrants "amassed substantial evidence that their generic products did
not infringe [Solvay's] formulation patent and that the patent was
invalid and/or unenforceable." 1 2 6 The FTC noted that Solvay and
Besins (from whom Solvay licensed the U.S. rights for Androgel)
bore the burden of proving that the generic formulas infringed on
their patents, and that they had not met that burden when the litigation
ended.127
The FTC v. Watson case also challenges co-promotion
arrangements that effectively allow the generic to share some of the
original patent holder's profits from the sale of the patented drug
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
116, 121.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at T1 4-6, 44.
Holman, supra note I1, at 494-95.
Holman, supranote 11, at 495.
Id.
FTC v. Watson Complaint, supra note 115, at %6, 93, 97, 100-02, 107, 109, 113,
Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 7-8.
FTC v. Watson Complaint,supra note 115, at
Id. at Ti 40, 91.

86.
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while the generic version remains out of the market.128 Par also
agreed to act as a "backup manufacturer" for AndroGel, an agreement
the FTC alleges was designed to compensate Par for not entering the
market.129 The FTC characterizes these agreements as means to
disguise the "pay for delay" nature of the settlement.13 0
The court will have to determine whether the Watson copromotion arrangement is an "ancillary agreement" of the type the
Eleventh Circuit upheld in Schering-Plough as an independent
business transaction.131 The FTC contends that the payments to
Watson and Par are not ancillary or independent business transactions
without anticompetitive motive or effect, alleging that the value of the
Solvay's promised payments far exceed the services provided and
depart from industry standards.13 2
The FTC's 2008 Cephalon complaint also involves "side-deals"
with the patent holder and four generic first-ANDA filers worth over
$200 million. Scott Hemphill analyzed public data on contracts
between generics and patent holders and found such "side deals" or
"independent transactions" rare except in cases of reverse payment
settlements. 133 Hemphill's findings add to the chorus of skepticism
about the independent nature of these transactions with likely
competitors.
The large amount of money and other consideration exchanged
in these settlements has generated criticism about the suggestion that
they are tailored to reflect the patent's scope or independent side
deals. Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson argue that settlement payments
that exceed expected litigation costs or that facially exceed the patent
grant should be presumed per se illegal.134
The Department of Justice (DOJ) in its 2009 brief filed in the
Ciprofloxacin case pending in the Second Circuit urged adoption of a
standard whereby pharmaceutical settlements should be treated as

128. Id. at 5, 62, 66, 77.
129. Id. at 174.
130. Id. at 81.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073, 1076 (11 Cir. 2005).
131.
132. FTC v. Watson Complaint, supra note 115, at 182, 84-85.
133. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 110, at 666 ("Outside of
settlement, brand-name firms seldom contract with generic firms for help with the activities that
form the basis of side deals.. .with the exception of authorized generic arrangements" through
which the patent holder authorizes one generic to market the generic version of the patented
drug.).
134. Chaves Mosier and Ritcheson, supra note 32, at 511.
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presumptively unlawful under the Sherman Act.135 The DOJ urged
consideration of factors such as whether the settlement was greatly in
excess of avoided litigation costs. It also stressed the need to weigh
the consumer harm of the settlement stating that "[i]f the settlement
involves a payment in exchange for the generic manufacturer's
agreement to withdraw its challenge to the patent and to delay entry,
there is no need to determine whether the patent would in fact have
been held invalid in order to conclude that the settlement likely
disadvantaged consumers."' 36 This Article argues as discussed in
section V that the settlement's effect on the ability of third-party
generic challengers to compete should also be given substantial
weight, particularly since settlement parties make a deliberate choice
to remove those barriers or leave them in place.
V. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS, COVENANTS NOT TO SUE
AND THIRD-PARTY GENERICS; THE CASE METHOD'S MYOPIA AS
TO THE LONG VIEW

The MMA allows subsequent ANDA filers to bring a declaratory
judgment proceeding to challenge the patent's validity or seek a
determination that its generic drug does not infringe on the patent.'
The MMA's declaratory judgment provisions were "designed to
prevent patentees from 'gaming' the Hatch-Waxman Act" by opening
a door to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period.13 8
Some patent holders have prolonged or thwarted the declaratory
judgment process by failing to sue first or subsequent ANDA filers
for infringement on all relevant patents and by unilaterally providing
a covenant not to sue as to infringement of the remaining patents.' 3 9
This may be done in an attempt to deprive the subsequent ANDA filer
of subject matter jurisdiction for the declaratory judgment
proceeding.140 To obtain jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment
action concerning the parties' rights and request for relief, "actual

135. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG,
No. 05-2851-cv at 10, 19 (2 nd Cir. July 6, 2009). This case is a related appeal of the same case at
issue in the Federal Circuit Cipro decision.
136. Id. at 26.
137. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (2006).
138. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1342 & n. 7 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
139. Id. at 1343, 1345.
140. Id. at 1335.
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controversy" between the parties is necessary.141 Plaintiffs seeking a
declaratory judgment bear the burden of proving actual controversy
by a preponderance of the evidence.14 2
Ritchie commented that "[a]t its core, civil procedure seeks to
ensure that proper jurisdiction is established in order to afford parties
fair access to courts without requiring parties to be hauled into court
inappropriately." 4 3 The question is whether covenants not to sue
terminate the case or controversy between the patent holder and the
ANDA filer, even if it means the generic applicant cannot obtain a
substantive judicial hearing on its claim that the NBD's patent is
invalid or that its generic drug does not infringe.
In Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court held
in 2007 that whether a declaratory action presents a justiciable
controversy under Article III of the Constitution must be determined
by examining "all circumstances." 144 MedImmune rejected the
Federal Circuit's more limited "reasonable apprehension of suit test,"
under which some covenants not to sue were found to deprive a
subsequent ANDA filer of subject matter jurisdiction. 145
In Teva Pharmaceuticalsv. Novartis, the Federal Circuit applied
the MedImmune "all circumstances" test to determine that patent
holder Novartis' decision to sue for infringement on only one of the
five patents implicated by a first ANDA filer's submission to the
FDA indicated that there was an actual case or controversy between
the parties necessary for declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 14 6 The
Federal Circuit found that Novartis' suit on one patent placed "into
actual dispute the soundness of Teva's ANDA [Teva's certification
under paragraph IV that its application did not infringe on Novartis'
patents or that those patents were invalid] and Teva's ability to secure

Patel, supra note 44, at 1091(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006); U.S. CONST. Art. Ill
141.
(specifying that cases or controversies between the litigants are a necessary basis for judicial
power).
142. Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (D. Del. 2009) (citing Shell Oil
Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
143. Ritchie, supra note 4, at 125.
144. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
145. Id. at 133 n.l 1; Cf Teva Pharm. USA v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
reh'g en banc denied, 405 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert denied, 546 U.S. 958 (2005) (applying
the reasonable apprehension of suit test to find no case or controversy existed for a HWA
declaratory judgment action brought by subsequent ANDA filer where the patent holder failed
to sue the subsequent ANDA for infringement of two patents implicated by the filing).
146. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1341-42, 1345-46
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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approval of the ANDA."l 4 7 In Teva, Novartis did not issue a covenant
not to sue on the remaining patents, a factor that left Teva open to
future litigation on the remaining patents relevant to its generic drug
application.148 For subsequent ANDA filers, covenants not to sue may
foreclose litigation necessary to a declaratory judgment
determination.
Caraco v. Forest Labs is an important post-Medlmmune case
that applied the "all circumstances" test in evaluating whether
covenants not to sue deprived a subsequent ANDA filer of subject
matter jurisdiction to challenge the NBD holder's patents.14 9 Forest
sued Ivax, the first ANDA filer, on one of the two patents relevant to
Forest's drug, the '712 patent, which expired earlier than then '941
patent which also pertained to the drug. In litigation between Forest
and Ivax the court found that the '712 patent Forest sued on was
valid, infringed, and enforceable. ISO
Caraco subsequently filed an ANDA application and Forest sued
Caraco for infringement of the same patent it had previously litigated
against Ivax. 5 ' Forest also unilaterally granted Caraco a covenant not
to sue on the remaining patent with the stated goal 'to confirm' that
there was no case or controversy between the parties regarding the
'941 patent." 5 2 Caraco brought a declaratory judgment action and
sought to sue on both patents.
The Federal Circuit held that in the context of the HatchWaxman Act, Forest's covenant not to sue did not eliminate the
controversy between the parties. 15' The Federal Circuit emphasized
that the Hatch-Waxman Act gave Caraco an economic interest in
determining whether both patents were infringed because only such a
determination could trigger Ivax's exclusivity period and open the
door for Caraco's entry prior to the expiration the '941 patent, which
expired after the '712 patent that was the subject of the litigation with
Caraco and Ivax.1 54 The Federal Circuit noted that despite the
covenant not to sue, Forest refused to concede that the '941 patent
was invalid or not infringed by Caraco's ANDA.' 55 Emphasizing the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1335, 1345.
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Inc.v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1288.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1289.
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HWA's goals, the Federal Circuit concluded that Forest's actions
resulted in injury-in-fact necessary for jurisdiction because they
potentially excluded non-infringing generic drugs if Caraco is correct
that its generic drug does not infringe Forest's '941 patent. 156
The Federal Circuit also evaluated a covenant not to sue a
subsequent ANDA filer in the Janssen Pharmaceutica N V v.
Apotex. 5 7 Janssen held three patents relevant to Apotex's application,
referred to as the '663 patent, the '425 patent and the '587 patent.'
In a separate litigation to which Apotex was not a party, the Federal
Circuit found the '663 patent to be valid and infringed.' 5 9 After
Apotex served Janssen with notice of its subsequent ANDA
application, Janssen sued Apotex for infringement of the '663 patent,
but not the '425 or '587 patent, and provided Apotex irrevocable
covenants not to sue on the latter two patents. 160
During the course of Apotex's attempt to seek a declaratory
judgment against Janssen that its subsequent ANDA filing did not
infringe on Janseen's patents or that they were not valid, Apotex
stipulated as to "infringement, validity, and enforceability of the '663
patent based on the Federal Circuit opinion." 16 1 The Federal Circuit
held that Apotex's stipulation as to the validity of the '663 patent
ended the case or controversy between the parties because Apotex
could not market the drug until the end of the term for the '663 patent
which expired earlier than the other relevant patents. 162
Apotex alleged actual injury remained because it would face a
180-day delay in marketing its generic once the '663 patent expired
because of the exclusivity granted to the first ANDA filer, Teva who
had previously settled with Jannsen. 16 3 The Federal Circuit attributed
the 180-day delay Apotex would experience in marketing its generic
drug to the features of the Hatch-Waxman Act that allow the first
ANDA filer a six month exclusivity period, and held that such delay
did not create a case or controversy between the parties.64
Janssen v. Apotex ultimately turned on the subsequent ANDA
156. Id. at 1292.
157. Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Apotex, 540 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1358 (citing Jannsen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 456 F.3d 644,
671 (D.N.J. 2006), aff'd, 223 Fed. Appx. 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
160. Janssen, 540 F.3d 1352.
161.
Id. at 1358.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1359.
164. Id. at 1360.
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filer's stipulation as to the validity of one of the relevant patents and
the generic drug's infringement on that patent, precluding a
declaratory judgment to the contrary. Plaintiffs unwilling to stipulate
as to the validity or infringement of any of the challenged patents may
nonetheless be faced with covenants not to sue which create delay
while a district and then an appellate court weigh "all circumstances"
to determine if a case or controversy remains.
In Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., the court found subject matter
jurisdiction for a subsequent ANDA's declaratory judgment action
noting the subsequent ANDA had not stipulated as to the validity or
infringement of any of the patents that precluded determination of the
subsequent ANDA filer's request for declaratory judgment. 165 Absent
such a stipulation, the Delaware district court properly emphasized
the MMA's goal and the HWA's policies to "balance the need for
pharmaceutical innovation with the need for generic drug
competition."l66 It also cited Caraco favorably for its recognition that
the HWA and its MMA amendment were intended to foster "early
resolution of patent disputes when subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
filers are blocked by a first generic applicant's 180-day exclusivity

period."1 67
In Teva v. Abbott, the Delaware District Court recognized that
the execution of covenants not sue on some but not all patent claims
deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the patent holder's
declaratory judgment claims as to the validity of two of the patents at
issue, but did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the generic
competitors' antitrust claims. 168 Under this test, jurisdiction will be
preserved only if the generic competitor also files an antitrust claim.
If the patent holder refuses to sue the ANDA filer and issues
covenants not to sue, that ANDA filer would have to allege that such
actions violated the antitrust laws to fall within the jurisdictional basis
found in Teva v. Abbot.
The Medlmmune "all circumstances" test has limited the
effectiveness of covenants not to sue as a mechanism to block
jurisdiction by subsequent ANDA filers in many declaratory
judgment actions. It has not, however, ended the substantial delays
caused by litigation over covenants not to sue. Courts since
MedImmune continue to thread the needle between Caraco and
165.
166.
167.
168.

Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009).
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 365.
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Jannsen to determine whether the facts of the case and "all
circumstances" merit a determination that subject matter jurisdiction
remains despite a covenant not to sue. This determination creates
substantial delays in obtaining a substantive hearing about the
declaratory judgment motion if a district court and appellate court
must both decide whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in light of
a covenant not to sue on some but not all patents relevant to the
subsequent generic filer's application.
For first ANDA filers, Congress requires cooperation in the
litigation to hasten determination of whether the generic drug
application should be approved.' 69 In Teva v. Novartis, the Federal
Circuit emphasized that "Congress explicitly required that in
exchange for the 30-month stay [during which the FDA would not
approve the first ANDA application], patentees were to 'reasonably
cooperate in expediting the action' of determining whether the
paragraph IV patents were invalid or not infringed."170 For subsequent
ANDA filers there is no such duty to reasonably cooperate to expedite
a declaratory judgment action. While the MMA authorized
subsequent ANDAs to seek a declaratory judgment as to the patent's
validity or their non-infringement, it did not likewise require the
patent holder to cooperate in ensuring those cases could be
expeditiously heard.
The Federal Circuit noted that the patent holder Novartis' actions
in suing the first ANDA filer, Teva, on only one of five relevant
patent claims attempted to insulate Novartis "from any judicial
determination of the metes and bounds of the scope of the claims of
its four .. . method patents. . ., a determination that is central to the
proper function of our patent system and is a central purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act."' 7 1 The reasoning of Teva v. Novartis that
declined to let the patent holder stymie the first ANDA's declaratory
judgment action regarding its generic application applies with equal
force to subsequent ANDA filers. For those subsequent filers, the
patent holder's tactics to undercut jurisdiction or stall a declaratory
judgment proceeding flout the MMA's purpose to allow subsequent
generics to seek such a judgment to trigger the first ANDA's
timeclock and jumpstart competition.

169. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharrns. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2007)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1343 (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d 990, 992 (Fed. Cir.
2005), reh g en banc denied, (Gajarsa, J., dissenting)).

176 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
Courts and the FTC should examine whether a patent holder
intends to use covenants not to sue and similar tactics in an attempt to
remove declaratory judgment jurisdiction for ANDA filers, despite
the absence of factors that make the case more like Jannsen. Patent
holders must be mindful that objectively baseless litigation may
create a patent misuse or sham litigation claim, opening the door to
antitrust liability.172 While exercise of the right to petition the
government is ordinarily immune from antitrust liability under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine,17 3 U.S. courts have recognized that abuse
of the litigation process to limit competition falls outside the umbrella
of Noerr antitrust immunity. 174
"A patent owner may be subject to antitrust liability for the
anticompetitive effects of bringing suit if the accused infringer proves
that the suit was a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with business relationships of a
competitor." 75 To meet the sham litigation test, the suit must be
"objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
reasonably expect success on the merits."17 6 If it is determined to be
baseless, the "defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that a plaintiff s activities were not really efforts to vindicate its rights
in court," 7 7 but conceal "an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor." 7 8
Some may argue that covenants not to sue are designed to
prevent litigation and thus cannot be classified as falling within the
sham or abuse of litigation exception to the right to petition the
government recognized in Noerr-Pennington. Yet, covenants not to
sue are often deployed strategically to try to prevent subject matter
jurisdiction to hear an ANDA filer's declaratory judgment petition on
the merits, and spawn litigation about jurisdiction that often takes a
year or more to litigate as the district then the appellate court reviews
the jurisdiction issue. While the jurisdictional effect of a covenant not
172. Prof'I Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industry, 508 U.S. 49 (1993), 6061; Medlmmune v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, n.1 1(2007).
173. See generally California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (Noerr immunity protects petitions to government entities including the courts,
legislature and administrative agencies).
174. Id.; Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-38 (1961); see generally United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
175. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 345, 361 (D. Del. 2008).
176. Prof'IReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
177. Teva Pharm. USA, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
178. Id. at 361(citing Prof'lRealEstate Investors, 580 U.S. at 60-61).
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to sue a subsequent ANDA filer is litigated, the first generic usually
remains parked in a blocking position, no forfeiture event has
occurred, a subsequent generic applicant's attempts to seek
declaratory judgments is stalled, prices remain high, and competition
is foreclosed. The result is the same as abusive litigation; to delay or
deter competition, whether by starting litigation or by attempting to
deprive the generic competitor of jurisdiction to have their case heard.
This Article recommends that Congress require patent holders to
report covenants not to sue ANDA filers to the FTC so that the FTC
can monitor and evaluate the use of this and similar litigation tactics
in delaying generic competition. The FTC should monitor and issue a
report on whether covenants not to sue are being used inappropriately
to delay or forestall judgment of legitimate claims and limit
competition from generic drugs.
The MMA requires that parties to reverse payment settlements
report such a transaction to the FTC.'"9 This requirement has
informed the public about the frequency, type, and character of
reverse payment settlements.180 Reporting covenants not to sue
ANDA filers will shed light on what is often the second phase of a
reverse payment settlement; an attempt to prevent the forfeiture
triggers from occurring that would start the first ANDA's clock,
opening the way for subsequent generic competitors. Prompt
reporting to the FTC of the use of such covenants in ANDA
applications will allow the Commission to conduct a longitudinal
analysis to assess the use and anticompetitive effect of the first
ANDA settlement and attempts to block declaratory judgment actions
by subsequent filers. 18 ' This information is currently obscured by the
case-by-case approach of litigation.182 Courts should take into account
the FTC's reports on the use of such covenants and other techniques
that block subsequent ANDA competition in weighing the parties'
representations that their settlement does not block or limit third-party
competition.
It is critical that courts examine the effect of reverse settlement
agreements on third-party generics which may not enter the market
179. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(2005).
180. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 106, at 633 ("Agencies
have a decisive advantage in collecting and synthesizing aggregate information, given their
expertise, access to confidential information about regulated firms, and freedom to examine
issues over a long period of time, outside the litigation context.")
181.
Id. at 671 (arguing the FTC should seek full details about each settlement and collect
from each brand-name firm a detailed catalogue of its dealing with generic firms).
182. Id. (noting that courts have little capacity to collect aggregate data).
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while the agreement between the patent holder and the first generic
stalls the start of the 180-day exclusivity period. Although that delay
is caused in part by interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its
amendments, certain reverse settlement agreements erect or maintain
barriers to third-party entry by forestalling the legal judgments or
actions that would start the clock. Covenants not to sue and similar
tactics often delay attempts to restart that clock. The parties'
representations about use of such covenants and similar delay tactics
in declaratory judgment actions by ANDA filers should be weighed as
a factor in determining whether a settlement is anticompetitive.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION REGARDING REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS; THE NEED TO REGULATE COVENANTS NOT TO
SUE AND THEIR EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT ANDA FILERS
As of December 2009, Congress is considering two bills that
would limit reverse payment settlements. The Senate bill, S. 369,
states that its purposes are to:
(1) enhance competition in the pharmaceutical market by
stopping anticompetitive agreements between brand name and generic
drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition
from generic drugs; and
(2) to support the purpose and intent of antitrust law by
prohibiting anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry
that harm consumers.183
The Senate bill creates a presumption that a settlement
agreement "resolving or settling, on a final or interim basis, a patent
infringement claim in connection with the sale of a drug product"
ANDA application has anticompetitive effects and is unlawful if: "(i)
an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (ii) the ANDA filer
agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing,
marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time."1 84
It creates an exception to that presumption if "the parties to such
agreement demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement." 8 s The bill lists a variety of
factors to be taken into account in making that assessment of the
183. S. 369, 111 st Cong. §2(b) (as reported by Senate, February 3, 2009).
184. S. 369 §§ 28(a)(1); 28 (a)(2)(A)(i)(ii). Note that the Senate bill applies only to
settlements of patent infringement claims, not to cases challenging the patent's validity.
185. S. 369 § 28(a)(2)(B).
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agreement's benefits and anticompetitive effects including "the length
of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent,
compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product,"
and "any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems
relevant to its determination of competitive effects under this
subsection." 186 S. 369 gives the FTC authority to enforce the bill
against "the parties to any agreement resolving or settling, on a final
or interim basis, a patent infringement claim, in connection with the
sale of a drug product."' 87
The House bill, H.R. 1706, prohibits agreements "resolving or
settling a patent infringement claim in which.. .an ANDA received
anything of value; and ... agrees not to research, develop,
manufacture, market or sell, for any period of time, the drug that is to
be manufactured under the ANDA involved and is the subject of the
patent infringement claim."188 The House bill provides exceptions to
the above for agreements where the value the ANDA receives is the
right to market the drug before expiration of the patent or [removal
ofJ any other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the drug's

marketing.189
The bills do not lay out the rationale for only regulating reverse
payment settlement cases that concern infringement claims as
opposed to patent validity claims. This Article recommends that the
bills be amended to clarify that they apply even if patent infringement
is only one of the allegations filed in the course of the parties'
litigation. This is necessary to avoid the patent holder's strategic
abandonment of its infringement claim prior to settlement so that the
settlement is based only on the patent validity claim, and thus falls
outside of the scope of the statute contemplated by Senate bill S. 369
or House bill H.R. 1706.
The bills focus on only patent validity claims might have the
unintended effect but predictable consequence of patent holders
refusing to sue for infringement, relying instead on the generic's
incentives to file a claim challenging the patent's validity. In response
the generic may assert that its drug does not infringe the patent and
seek a declaratory judgment on non-infringement. It should be
anticipated, however, that the parties to a reverse payment settlement
will have an incentive to drop the infringement claim before their
186.
187.
188.
189.

S. 369 §28(b)(1),(7).
S. 369 §28(a)(1).
H.R. 1706, 11 Ist Cong. § 2(a)(1)(2) (2009).
H.R. 1706 § 2(b)(1)(A)(B).
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interim or final settlement in order to avoid scrutiny under any law
limited to patent infringement claims.
S. 369 provides certain exclusions from the bill's limits on HWA
pharmaceutical settlements "in which the consideration granted by the
NDA holder to the ANDA filer as part of the resolution or settlement
includes. .[a] covenant not to sue on any claim that the ANDA
product infringes a United States patent."1 90 The House bill, H.R.
1706, provides that the first ANDA's 180-day exclusivity period
would be forfeited by a court dismissal of a declaratory judgment
action as to the patent's validity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
with or without prejudice.9' It would also require forfeiture of that
exclusivity period if the "applicant files with the FDA Secretary a
covenant by the patent owner that the patent owner will not sue the
applicant for infringement with respect to the patent." 92
Unbargained-for covenants not to sue that stymie attempts to
have a declaratory judgment heard should be distinguished from those
given in consideration for termination of litigation whose result is to
allow the generic drug to be marketed. In Caraco the Federal Circuit
recognized that "a covenant not to sue on a patent ensures that the
covenant's recipient will not be liable for an injunction for
infringement of that patent." 1 9 3 In Teva v. Novartis the Federal Circuit
cited the HWA's legislative history that recognized where a generic
applicant has challenged a patent by filing an ANDA, a case or
controversy will arise, except "in the rare circumstance in which the
patent owner and brand drug company have given the generic
applicant a covenant not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge
that the generic applicant's drug does not infringe."l 94 This legislative
history addressed a covenant not to sue the first ANDA filer that
would allow that filer to seek FDA approval to market the drug.
For subsequent ANDA filers, covenants not to sue may have the
opposite effect. They erect legal barriers to subject matter jurisdiction
to seek a declaratory judgment of the patent's invalidity and/or the
generic's non-infringement. Covenants not to sue deter entry by
subsequent ANDA filers who must litigate whether the covenant
deprives them of subject matter jurisdiction for a declaratory
190.
S. 369 § 28 (d)(3).
191. H.R. 1706 § 4(CC).
192. H.R. 1706 § 4(DD).
193. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1296, reh'g en banc
denied, (2008).
194. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing 149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (Nov. 25, 2003) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)).
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judgment, adding litigation cost and delay to subsequent ANDA
challenges and competition.
This Article recommends that Congress require that in weighing
the barriers to third-party competition created by a reverse payment
settlement, the fact finder should consider whether the settlement
contains a binding representation that the patent holder has not and
will not attempt to deprive a subsequent ANDA filer of subject matter
jurisdiction to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the patent's validity
or non-infringement of the generic drug. Without such a
representation a court or fact finder may only speculate as to whether
the patent holder might try to block a subsequent ANDA filer from its
day in court in a declaratory judgment action. Requiring a
representation that covenants not to sue and similar tactics will not be
used in an attempt to deprive a subsequent ANDA filer of subject
matter jurisdiction will allow a fuller assessment of the settlement's
barriers to entry for third-party generic competitors. Where a patent
holder has already tried to block subsequent ANDA filers from
obtaining declaratory judgments through procedural challenges to
subject matter jurisdiction, the reviewing court should take such facts
into account in weighing whether the settlement with the first ANDA
filers is anticompetitive.
Congress should also provide that the FTC retains jurisdiction to
bring a case against the patent holder or NBD in a reverse payment
settlement who, following approval of that settlement, uses covenants
not to sue and similar tactics to forestall jurisdiction for declaratory
judgment actions by subsequent ANDA filers, unless that subsequent
ANDA filer has stipulated as to the patent's validity or infringement
by the generic drug. The bill should provide that such use of
covenants not to sue to deprive a subsequent ANDA of subject matter
jurisdiction creates a rebuttable presumption that it is anticompetitive
in light of their predictable and often intended result of producing
substantial delay in the substantive consideration of the subsequent
ANDA's petition.
To remove incentives for such delay tactics, Congress should
require that patent holders and NBD makers 'reasonably cooperate in
expediting the action' of a first or subsequent paragraph IV ANDA
filter's request for declaratory judgment as to whether the patents
were invalid or not infringed. 195 Reviewing courts and the FTC
should also be required to weigh whether the settlement is in the
public interest, including an evaluation of whether the settlement
195.

Id. at 1343 (citing 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)

(2007)).
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maintains or removes barriers or delays that effect third-party efforts
to obtain FDA approval to market generic drugs.
As suggested in the preceding section, Congress should require
that patent holders and NBD makers report to the FTC the use of
covenants not to sue generic ANDA filers. This is necessary to
monitor the extent to which suits, or the lack of suits against
subsequent ANDA filers, and covenants not to sue are designed to
forestall declaratory judgments or triggers to permitting generic entry.
Congress should require the FTC to monitor trends in the use of
covenants not to sue and similar delay tactics against ANDA filers,
report its findings to Congress, and make recommendations on any
steps taken or needed to curb anticompetitive use of such procedures.
VII.CONCLUSION
This reflection reviews the developments in pharmaceutical
settlements with potential generic drug manufacturers to highlight the
need for legislative reform in this area and judicial scrutiny of the use
of covenants not to sue and similar devices. Courts and the FTC must
weigh the full panoply of tactics that delay, defer or discourage
generic drug entry. They must evaluate whether a reverse payment
settlement erects or maintains barriers to third-party competition in
determining whether that settlement is anticompetitive.
This article suggests amendments to the pending legislation to
strengthen the FTC's ability to monitor, assess, and take action to
curb those delay tactics. The FTC can play a valuable regulatory role
in collecting information on covenants not to sue as it does now for
reverse payment settlements. These efforts will empower consumers,
Congress, the Commission and the courts in assessing the effect of
settlement or delay tactics such as covenants not to sue.
This Article also stresses that the presumption of patent validity
does not apply to infringement cases where the patent holder has the
burden of making a prima facie case of infringement. Particularly
where there is strong evidence of non-infringement, such
presumptions do not track the patent's scope and must yield to
analysis of the agreement's anticompetitive effects in violation of the
antitrust laws and the FTC Act. Neither should the procedural
presumption of patent validity that primarily allocates to the plaintiff
the burden of proof of showing non-validity be converted into a
device for antitrust liability.
I commend the many contributions to antitrust law made by the
Santa Clara Computer and High Tech Law Journal since its founding
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more than twenty-five years ago. During the past five years the CJTLJ
has highlighted many issues in antitrust and unfair competition law the tension between contract, intellectual property and antitrust law;
the factors to use in determining the appropriate standard to analyze
conduct challenged as an antitrust law violation, and; the role of
intellectual property and antitrust law in competition and innovation.
It is my hope that this body of work contributes to the ability of
courts, regulators, legislators, scholars, the business and legal
communities and the public to promote incentives for innovation,
while protecting competition and consumers.
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